Resource Dependence Theory Part II, Managing
Dependence on External Organizations
EDUC 250B: Organizational Analysis of Higher
Education
Ozan Jaquette
Overview
PLEASE EXCUSE TYPOS
Historical context, motivating ideas for resource dependence
theory
Resource dependence theory (RDT) in historical context
Resource dependence theory is a child of the 1970s
- This was an era of giant “conglomerate” corporations that were
horizontally diversified
- Meaning that a single corporation often producted products in
completely unrelated markets (e.g., furniture and electronics)
Ideas Pfeffer & Salancik (1978)
arguing against
- “theory of the firm” from economics
- assumption that the goal of corporations is to maximize profit
- Orgs maximize profit by prioritizing efficiency/productivity;
maximize revenue and minimize costs
- But actual firms and firm behavior bore little resemblance to firms
theorized by economists
So Pfeffer & Salancik (1978)
developed RDT to explain why actual firms of the 1970s behaved the way
they did
- RDT is a manager-focused theory written mainly about large
corporations
- Managers don’t pursue profit; they pursue stability, survival,
perks
Core ideas motivating resource dependence theory
All orgs depend on resources from external environment to survive
- in turn, key to org survival is ability to acquire and maintain
resources
- In particular, orgs depend on other orgs for many resources they
require for survival
- orgs don’t like uncertainty of resource flows because increases
probability of death and can’t plan
- Overriding concern of orgs is how to manage dependencies with
external orgs such that the org maintains steady flow of resources
necessary for survival
- If orgs prioritized profit/efficiency (maximize revenue, minimize
costs) could create dependencies that lead to future problems
- e.g., org could be easily controlled by key resource providers
- could lead to uncertainty in resource flows that cause org
death
- Like economists, Pfeffer & Salancik
(1978) assumes managers are “rational”
- but care about long-term survival more than short-run
profit/efficiency
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) argue
that these ideas do a better job of explaining org behavior than “theory
of the firm”
- Doesn’t make sense for a car producer to buy an iron mine from
profit/efficiency perspective (mining iron not what firm does well)
- But could make sense for car producer to buy iron mine if goal is to
ensure stable flow of resources necesssary for survival
How orgs manage dependence on external orgs
How orgs respond to dependence on external orgs
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) develop
set of organizational responses to the problem of dependence on actors
in external environment
- These organizational responses are the focus of chapters 5 - 10
Broad strategy in choosing organizational response
- “Choose the least-constraining device to govern relations with your
exchange partners that will allow you to minimize uncertainty and
dependence and maximize your autonomy” (Davis
& Cobb, 2010, p. 5)
- Logic of this statement:
- External orgs you are dependent on constrain your actions
- so respond in ways that minimize uncertainty in access to important
resources while also attempting to reduce constraint/dependence on
external orgs
- Organizational responses can be arranged from less to more
constraining
- all things equal, choose the least constraining
Overview of org response to dependence
Responses designed to “manage demands” by external orgs (chapter
5)
- Compliance
- Avoid fulfilling demands of resource provider you depend on
- Avoid being dependent on particular resource provider
Responses to control external orgs or reduce reliance on external
orgs (chapter 6)
- Merger/acquisition of external resource provider
- vertical merger
- horizontal merge
- Organizational growth
- [also talks about resource diversification here]
Inter-organizational action to control external environment (chapter
7)
- Trade/professional associations
- Cooptation
- Joint ventures
Managing demands by external orgs (chapter 5): compliance,
avoidance, resource diversification
Managing demands by external orgs: compliance
Problem
- Org relies on resources from particular external resource provider
and cannot easily get this resource from other providers
- External resource provider demands org do certain things in order to
obtain resources
- These demands may be onerous
- or these demands may conflict with demands from another important
resource provider
Compliance strategy (also called acquiescence):
- do what the external org tells you to do
- This is similar to Emerson (1962) idea
of acquiescence to demands of more powerful other
- results in “costs”/effort/pain
- Generally, adopt this strategy when you don’t have other real
options
Example: researcher reliance on funding from particular
foundation
- Foundation changes requirements for receipt of funding (e.g.,
changes what things must be in “deliverable”)
- Compliance: do what foundation asks
Managing demands by external orgs: avoidance
Problem
- reliance on resources from external resource provider that you
cannot easily obtain elsewhere; and resource proivder demands certain
actions
General definition of avoidance
- strategies to avoid demands by external resource provider
Two broad types of avoidance strategies:
- Avoid fulfilling demands of external actor you are dependent on
- i.e., you still depend on resources from external org, but you find
ways to avoid fulfilling demands of external org
- Avoid being dependent on external actor in the first place
- Find ways to reduce dependence on resources provided by particular
external org, so that org can survive/thrive without fulfilling demands
of external org
Avoid fulfilling demands of external actor you depend on
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) describe
many strategies to avoid fulfilling demands of external actors you dpend
on for resources
- Unimportant to memorize each strategy; understand broad ideas
- Most of these strategies involve guile: e.g., secrecy/restricting
information; use demands of one resource provider to avoid demands of
another
Control definition of satisfaction. Example:
- Cannot receive PhD until dissertation committee approves revisions;
PhD student negotiates to reduce amount of required revisions
Symbolic (rather than substantive) acquiescence to
demands. Examples:
- Parents demand kid cleans up toys
- kid throws everything in closet
- State demands you provide access for low-income students in exchange
for state funding;
- university adopts “outreach” program, but gives program small
budget
- university adopts “no loan” need-based grant program, but don’t
advertise program or make eligibility difficult
Balance (conflicting) demands of multiple resource
providers. Examples:
- playing orgs off one another
- say you can’t do what one org asks because would violate demand by
other org
- Attend to demands sequentially
- Tell resource provider you will satisfy demand after you satisfy
demand of other provider
Avoid dependence on particular resource provider
Responses to reduce dependence on particular provider when provider
makes onerous demands or resources become uncertain:
- Alternative resources:
- most obvious solution is to find alternatives to resource provided
by particular provider
- Exert control on external resource provider
- Merger/acquisition with provider (chapter 6)
- Coordination/coalition with other orgs to control resource provider
(chapter 7)
Alternative resources to avoid dependence on particular resource
provider
Response: find alternative resources to reduce dependence on
particular provider when provider makes onerous demands or resources
become uncertain
Two broad types of alternative resources:
- Find alternative sources of supply of same resource
- e.g., University relies on technology company to create online
courses; if tech company now demands that it “owns” intellectual
property of these courses, solution is to find different tech
company
- With respect to Pfeffer & Salancik
(1978), when actor \(B\) depends
on actor \(A\), this is “extending the
power network” to find alternative providers of the same resource
provided by \(A\)
- Resource diversification such that org less reliant
on particular resource
- “Given that the organization’s vulnerabilities derives from
dependence on single exchanges, the most direct solution is to develop
an organization which is dependent on a variety of exchanges and less
dependent on any single exchange” (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978, p. 109)
- e.g., University depends on state appropriations, but state funding
declines or state makes additional performance demands, university can
diversify revenue sources by growing nonresident enrollment or finding
big donors
- Changing which resources you use vs. diversifying resources
- Note that switching reliance from one resource (e.g., wool) to
another resource (cotton) changes which external resource providers you
depend on
- Diversifying resources (e.g., can use either wool or cotton as
input) makes you less reliant on any single set of resource
providers
Changing resources: mission drift and internal power dynamics
Internal actors most responsible for garnering important resources
from external environment exert most influence on org decision-making.
Example:
- University of Arizona depends on federal research funding for
revenue (financial resource) and prestige (reputational resource)
- Actors most responsible for garnering federal research funding (e.g,
STEM faculty in particular disciplines) most influental in org
decision-making
- These actors have most say in defining org mission
Imagine that federal research funding dries up and won’t come
back
- University responds by growing financial resources from private
donors and tuition revenue; prestige now depends more on academic
profile of enrolled students
- Shift in internal power dynamics; these actors now more powerful:
- Actors most responsible for private donors (e.g., office of external
relations)
- Actors most responsible for attracting nonresident students (e.g.,
football program), high-achieving students (e.g., office of enrollment
management)
Change in resource providers leads to change in organizational
mission
- Orgs more sensitive to demands of new external resource providers
(e.g., donors; affluent, high-achieving students)
- Internal actors most responsible for obtaining resources from these
new providers now have more say in org mission
- These actors may have different values than previously powerful
internal actors
Mergers/acquisitions to reduce dependence on external org (chapter
6)
Mergers/acquisitions: buying orgs you depend on
Examples of when to consider mergers (vertical merger)
- Dependent on particular supplier of input to produce outputs (e.g.,
car company depends on steel from big steel producer)
- Dependent on particular org to sell your products (e.g., furniture
company sells all its furniture to particular furniture seller)
The merger solution
- depend on exchange relationship with particular org and concerned
that org is controlling you?
- Solution: buy that org so that you control the exchange relationship
- e.g., buy the org that supplies the needed input
- e.g., buy the org that absorbs all your output
Types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, diversification
Vertical integration [buying suppliers and
distributors]
- buying upstream and downstream represents a method of “extending
organizational control over exchanges vital to its operation.”
- e.g., Purdue University buys tech firm to produce own online courses
so it doesn’t have to pay third-party vendor to make online courses
- Note: an alternative to acquisition is to develop these capacities
internally
horizontal expansion [buying competitors]
- why? potential customers become more dependent on your firm for that
thing you do because there are now fewer alternative providers
- why? to reduce uncertainty generated from competition
- e.g., enrollment management (EM) consulting firm buys another EM
consulting firm
diversification/conglomeration merger
- When an firm buys firms that operate in different product
markets;
- Makes org less sensitive to any single product line; less reliant on
resource provider for any single product line
- Results in “conglomerate firm” that operates in lots of different
markets
- popular through 1970s, but died in 1980s
How would we categorize this?:
- UCLA dept of education buys a high school
Organizational growth strategy to increase org survival
Organizational growth strategy
- When you are bigger, you can control your environment, you have more
alumni that care about your survival, and you are harder to kill
- Example: community colleges follow this strategy
How organizations can pursue growth strategy:
- through mergers (e.g., horizontal, diversification)
- or by aggressive expansion without mergers
Inter-organizational action to control external environment (chapter
7)
Inter-organizational action to control external environment
What is the problem
- Focal org dependent on resources from particular provider
- But cannot find alternative resource provider, cannot acquire
resource provider
Example: for-profit colleges dependent on accreditors, federal
regulators
- Revenue at for-profit college mostly derived from federal financial
aid
- Requirements for college to enroll students that receive federal
financial aid
- Accredited by accrediting agency recognized by secretary of US dept.
of Education
- Satisfy additional regulatory requirements of US dept of Ed (e.g.,
student loan default rates, Title IX regulations)
- Cannot find alternative resources or acquire these external
orgs
Solution: Linkages/coordination with other organizations
- Linkages with external resource providers (e.g., participate in
technical review panels about new regulations at US dept. of Ed)
- Linkages with other orgs controlled by these external resource
providers (e.g., coordinated action with other for-profit colleges)
Examples of inter-organizational linkages and benefits
Examples of inter-organizational linkages
- Professional associations/trade associations (e.g., American
Association of Community Colleges; Career Education Colleges and
Universities)
- Asking manager of external resource provider to serve on your
board
- Manager of focal org participating in activities of external
resource provider
- Partnership with other, prestigious organization
Potential benefits of inter-organizational linkages
- exert control over external resource provider by forming coalition
with other orgs like you and making unified demands
- e.g., what if GM suppliers formed a coalition
- Communicate with external resource provider, socialize them to be
supportive of focal org
- Influence policies/regulations by external resource provider that
affect focal org
- Increase legitimacy for your org by partnering with an org with
strong reputation
Professional/trade associations
What are they:
- “A collective structure that has developed to provide the
centralized information and coordination”
- Orgs in the same field [often competitors] form a permanent
coalition
Why form professional associations
- In order to negotiate with important resource provider as a unified
front
- external resource provider not dependent on any one org, but may be
very dependent on entire population of orgs
- so professional association negotiating on behalf of all orgs has
much more power over external resource provider than any single org
- Goal is often to lobby for favorable legislation
Examples in higher ed:
- Higher education professional associations (e.g., American Council
on Education, Association of American Universities) have main offices in
DC in order to lobby federal legislators
- American Association of Community Colleges (Brint & Karabel, 1989)
- Texas Association of Community Colleges
- “Our primary mission is advocacy to help lead policy development,
innovation and institutional practices in higher education.”
- e.g., lobby for more state funding, regulations that serve interests
of TX community colleges
Cooptation
General definition of cooptation
- Member of one group tries to gain decision-making power/influence
over another group
Cooptation in resource dependence theory:
- If you are reliant on a particular resource provider, invite members
of that resource provider into your org
- Goal is to socialize that resource provider to the goals of the
focal org; they become committed to the success of the focal org
- “members of the controlling organization are invited to participate
in various activities of the vulnerable organization, to sit on the
board of directors, advisory panels, and so forth. The aim of bringing
in potentially hostile outsiders is to socialize them and to commit them
to provide assistance to the focal organization.”
Cooptation, examples
Interlocking board directorates are most common example of
cooptation
- Focal organization invites influential decision-makers from
important external resource providers to sit on “board of
directors”/“board of trustees”
- e.g., examine board of directors of Lockheed
Martin
- Includes CEO of major steel corporation (war machines built from
steel)
- Includes retired Air Force General (ties to decision-makers in
military who decide on military contracts)
- Examine board of directors of foundations, especially ones not flush
with money
- Usually includes large number of people from finance world who can
generate revenues for the foundation
Cooptation can also be members of focal org participating in
activities of external resource provider they are dependent on
- e.g., Review panels in US dept of education that make
recommendations about new regulations, requiring new data
- Lots of representatives from for-profit sector
- lots of representatives from other higher ed professional
associations (e.g., Land Grant Universities)
- All want to avoid regulations and data collections that go against
interests of colleges they represent
- e.g., Board of Directors of Lumina
Foundation
- includes lots of “money people” that provide $ to Lumina
- includes representatives from universities that want $ from Lumina
and also provide legitimacy to Lumina
Cooptation example, The College Board
Stated mission
- “Founded in 1900, the College Board was created to expand access to
higher education. Today, the membership association is made up of over
6,000 of the world’s leading educational institutions and is dedicated
to promoting excellence and equity in education.”
What they actually do
- They are a vendor that sells tests to students
- An enrollment management vendor that sells personal information
about test-takers to universities (i.e., “prospect lists”)
- Their mission of access is debatable; but want to be perceived as
committed to access for sake of legitimacy
Cooptation
- Invite higher education scholars focused on access to serve on
advisory board that purports to focus on access
- good food+drink; generous honorarium/stipend
- Socializes these scholars to be less critical of College Board
- Increases legitimacy of “access mission” claims by College
Board
Other examples of inter-organizational linkages
Joint ventures
- if product you want to create depends on resources your org creates
and resources created by another org, can form “joint venture” to create
product
- Joint venture involves the creation of a new, separate,
organizational entity.
- Less constraining/costly than acquisition
- Often, joint ventures between orgs that produce stuff and orgs that
sell stuff
- Example in higher ed HERE: Joint venture between
universities and firm that recruits/admits international students
Partnering with an external organization that gives your organization
legitimacy/prestige
- e.g., community college developing transfer articulation agreements
with prestigious university
References
Brint, S. G., & Karabel, J. (1989). The diverted dream:
Community colleges and the promise of educational opportunity in
america, 1900-1985 (pp. ix, 312 p.). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Davis, G. F., & Cobb, J. A. (2010). Resource dependence theory: Past
and future. Research in the Sociology of Organizations,
28, 21–42.
Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations.
American
Sociological Review,
27(1), 31–41. Retrieved from
<Go to
ISI>://A1962CBJ7800003
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of
organizations: A resource dependence perspective (pp. xiii, 300
p.). New York: Harper; Row.