Resource Dependence Theory Part I, Emerson’s Theory
of Power
EDUC 250B: Organizational Analysis of Higher
Education
Ozan Jaquette
null
Overview
PLEASE EXCUSE TYPOS
Emerson (1962), Power-dependence
relations
Emerson (1962), introduction
Emerson (1962) theory of power
(described below) extremely influential
- In organizational theory
- e.g., is the basis for “resource dependence theory”
- is utilized in “new institutionalism”
- Influential in sociology more generally
Emerson (1962), core
concepts/definitions
Emerson (1962), introduction
Prevailing notions of “power” that Emerson
(1962) was arguing against
- Assume that power is an attribute of a person
- Idea that some people (e.g., the president, owner of business) are
“powerful” and other people not powerful
Emerson (1962) key intervention against
this view of power
- Power is an attribute of a relationship not an
attribute of a person
- “to say that ‘X has power’ is vacant, unless we specify ‘over whom’”
(p. 32)
Problem with “relational” view of power by Emerson (1962)
- viewing power solely as an attribute of a relationship between two
actors ignores power associated with – as the Combahee River Collective
Statement puts it – “oppressed social categories” (e.g., Black, female)
(Taylor, 2017)
Emerson (1962), introduction
Emerson (1962) focuses on
relationships among “actors” (“actor A”, “actor B”,
etc.)
- For Emerson (1962), “actor” was
usually a person
- But when theories of organizational behavior utilize Emerson (1962), actor could be an organization
or an organizational sub-unit
Emerson (1962) talks about social
relations as “ties of mutual dependence”
- That is, actors depend on each other to achieve things they
want
- but dependence of one actor on another is not necessarily equal
In this lecture, which explains core ideas of Emerson (1962), I often refer to actor
A and actor B
- In examples I provide below, usually the balance of power between
A and B will not be equal
- Since I don’t always specify who A and B are,
helpful to have a couple of common cases in mind:
- One actor is faculty advisor and the other is student
advisee (but sometimes I will change who is A and who is
B)
- One actor is manager/boss and the other is
employee (but sometimes I will change who is A and who
is B)
Core concepts: dependence (most important concept)
Dependence
- Actor \(A\) depends upon actor
\(B\) if \(B\) controls goals that \(A\) wants
- Definition: Dependence of actor \(A\) upon actor \(B\) (\(Dab\)) is:
- directly proportional to \(A\)’s
motivational investment in goals mediated by \(B\) AND
- inversely proportional to availability of those goals to \(A\) outside of \(A-B\) relation
Reflection on definition of dependence
- If actor \(B\) does not control
goals \(A\) cares about, then \(A\) not dependent on \(B\)
- If actor \(A\) can obtain goal from
other actors, then \(A\) less dependent
on \(B\)
Example: \(A\) is professor who
wants research funding; \(B\) is
foundation that funds research
- Professor (\(A\)) is very dependent
on Foundation (\(B\)) if:
- needs research funding that foundation (\(B\)) controls AND
- cannot get research funding from any other actor besides the
foundation (\(B\))
- Professor is less dependent on Foundation (\(B\)) if:
- Research funding isn’t absolutely essential for the research that
professor (\(A\)) wants to do
OR
- Professor (\(A\)) can get research
funding from several other organizations
Analyze this: student \(A\) needs
recommendation to obtain job; \(B\) is
professor who can write recommmendation
Core concepts: power
Definition: Power of actor \(B\) upon actor \(A\) (\(Pba\)) is:
- Emerson:
- The power of actor \(B\) over actor
\(A\) is the amount of resistance on
the part of \(A\) which can be
potentially overcome by \(B\)
- Said differently, \(B\) is powerful
over \(A\) if:
- \(B\) makes some demand on \(A\), and satisfying this demand runs
counter to the interests of \(A\), and
\(A\) cannot resist satisfying this
demand (because \(A\) is dependent on
\(B\) for some goal that \(A\) values)
Some reflections:
- Note that the power of \(B\) over
\(A\) is a function of how
dependent \(A\) is on
\(B\) (i.e., \(B\) controls goals that \(A\) wants and cannot get from other
actors)
Hypothetical example: it’s saturday night
- Actors:
- You (actor \(A\)) are a student;
have a great saturday night lined up
- Actor \(B\) is your boss and actor
\(C\) is your academic advisor (two
different people)
- Scenario:
- You get a text from your boss (\(B\)) asking you to do a task that takes all
Saturday night to complete
- You also get text from your academic avisor (\(C\)) asking you to do task that takes all
Saturday night to complete
- Questions:
- (According to Emerson (1962)), what
factors influence how you (\(A\))
respond?
- Does actor \(B\) or actor \(C\) have more power over you (\(A\))?
Core concepts: power-dependence relationship equation
\(Pba = Dab\)
- the power of \(B\) over \(A\) is equal to the dependence of \(A\) upon \(B\) (i.e., extent to which \(B\) controls goals that \(A\) wants and cannot get from other
actors)
\(Pab = Dba\)
- the power of \(A\) over \(B\) is equal to the dependence of \(B\) upon \(A\)
Hypothetical example: Imagine you (actor \(A\)) are research analyst working at a
“think-tank” and actor \(B\) is your
manager
- Power of manager (\(B\)) over
research analyst (\(A\))
- is equal to the extent to which manager (\(B\)) controls goals that research analyst
(\(A\)) wants and cannot obtain from
anyone besides manager (\(B\))
- Power of research analyst (\(A\))
over manager
- is equal to the extent to which research analyst (\(A\)) controls goals that manager (\(B\)) wants and cannot obtain from anyone
besides research analyst (\(A\))
- Anecdote: my first job as research analyst at Abt Associates Actor
\(A\) is worker; actor \(B\) is manager
Balance and imbalance in power-dependence relationships
Emerson (1962), p. 33:
- “The notion of reciprocity in power-dependency relations raises the
question of equality or inequality of power in the relation”
Balanced relationship
- The power of actor \(A\) over actor
\(B\) is equal to power of actor \(B\) over actor \(A\) because the dependence
of actor \(B\) on actor \(A\) is equal to dependence of actor \(A\) on actor \(B\)
Unbalanced relationship
- The power of actor \(A\) over actor
\(B\) is greater than power of actor
\(B\) over actor \(A\) because the dependence
of actor \(B\) on actor \(A\) is greater than the dependence of actor
\(B\) on actor \(A\).
- or vice-versa
Emerson (1962) reflections on
balance/imbalance
- When \(A\) has power over \(B\) AND \(B\) has power over \(A\), power is not removed from the
relationship
- reciprocal power does not cancel out power; rather it adds
“features” to the \(A-B\)
relationship
Balance and imbalance in power-dependence relationships
“Features” caused by power balance/imbalance in \(A-B\) relationship
- Power advantage
- “A power advantage of actor \(A\)
over actor \(B\) can be defined as:
- \(Pab\) (power of actor \(A\) over \(B\)) minus \(Pba\) (power of \(B\) over \(A\))”
- Power advantage of one actor over another could be positive or
negative (i.e., a power disadvantage)
- Power advantage could also be defined in terms of dependence:
- Power advantage of actor \(A\) over
actor \(B\) is equal to \(Dba\) (dependence of actor \(B\) upon actor \(A\)) minus \(Dab\) (dependence of actor \(A\) upon actor \(B\))
- Costs and cost reduction [this is appeasement,
acquiescence]
- Costs
- effort/pain involved for one actor (e.g., \(B\)) in meeting demands made by other actor
(e.g., \(A\)) when \(A\) has a power advantage over \(B\)
- Cost reduction:
- “Process involving change in values (personal, social, economic)
which reduces the pains incurred in meeting the demands of a powerful
other.”
- e.g., rationalizing to yourself that it isn’t so bad to do what more
powerful actor wants
- Cost reductions don’t reduce the power imbalance; rather it is a
process of rationalization that makes it less painful for \(B\) to acquiesce to demands of \(A\)
- I do not believe in appeasement, acquescence as a strategy!
- Balancing operations
- structural changes in power-dependence relations to reduce power
advantage
- i.e., things you can do if you are in power disadvantage in some
relationship
- I believe in punching the bully in the mouth by using the right
balancing operation
Emerson (1962), Balancing
operations
Balancing operations
Consider unbalanced relation in which \(A\) has power advantage over \(B\)
- \(Pab > Pba\): Power of \(A\) over \(B\) is greater than power of \(B\) over \(A\) because:
- \(Dba > Dab\): Dependence of
\(B\) upon \(A\) is greater than dependence of \(A\) upon \(B\)
Balancing operation
- structural changes in power-dependence relations to reduce power
advantage in an unbalanced relation
- Generally speaking, balance can be restored by increasing dependence
of \(A\) on \(B\) OR by decreasing
dependence of \(B\) on \(A\)
Four balancing operations to reduce the power advantage that \(A\) has over \(B\)
- \(B\) reduces motivational
investment in goals mediated by \(A\)
- (decreases dependence of \(B\) on
\(A\))
- \(B\) finds alternative resources
for goals mediated by \(A\)
- (decreases dependence of \(B\) on
\(A\))
- \(A\) increases motivational
investment in goals mediated by \(B\)
- (increases dependence of \(A\) on
\(B\))
- \(A\) is denied alternative sources
for achieving goals mediated by \(B\)
- (increases dependence of \(A\) on
\(B\))
Balancing operation 1: Withdrawal
Power imbalance Dba > Dab: Powerful \(A\) making demands on \(B\)
Balancing operation: \(B\) reduces
motivational investment in goal mediated by \(A\)
- called “withdrawal”: \(B\) decides
to no longer pursue goal mediated by \(A\)
Example: Kids \(A\) and \(B\) are “friends”
- \(A\) is popular; \(B\) wants populrity; \(B\) can be popular by being friends with
\(A\)
- \(A\) will be friends with \(B\) if: \(B\) does \(A\)’s homework; \(A\) gets to make fun of \(B\)
- “Withdrawal” balancing operation:
- \(B\) decides they don’t care that
much about being popular
- \(B\) stops trying to hang out with
\(A\)
Example: \(A\) is department head
and \(B\) is assistant professor
- \(B\) wants to get tenure; \(A\) wants to make progress on research
projects
- Assume that department head, \(B\),
substantially controls whether assistant prof \(A\) gets tenure (usually not true in
practice)
- \(A\) will “support” \(B\) if \(B\) works on \(A\)’s research projects
- If \(B\) works on \(A\)’s projects, \(B\) has less time for their own work
- “Withdrawal” balancing operation:
- \(B\) decides they don’t care that
much about getting tenure
- \(B\) stops working on \(A\)’s research projects
Balancing operation 2: extend the “power network”
“extending the power network” enables \(B\) to find alternative resources for goals
mediated by \(A\)
- power network: two or more connected power
dependence relationships (e.g., \(A-B\))
Imagine actor \(A\) is connected to
\(B\) and \(C\) but \(C\) and \(B\) don’t interact
- \(A\) is more powerful vis-a-vis
\(C\) and \(B\) because \(A\) can interact with \(C\) or \(B\), but \(C\) and \(B\) can only interact with \(A\)
- scenarios in which this could arise:
- \(A\), \(B\), and \(C\) are three kids who want friends to play
with
- \(A\) is an employer and \(B\) and \(C\) are workers
Balancing operations that extend the power network:
- “close the network”: \(C\) and
\(B\) form relationships with each
other
- e.g., \(C\) and \(B\) become friends with one another
- now, \(C\) no longer dependent
solely on \(A\) for friendship; \(B\) no longer solely dependent on \(A\) for friendship
- “lengthen the linear network”:
- \(C\) starts interacting with new
actor \(D\); and \(B\) starts interacting with new actor \(E\)
- network now looks like this: \(D-C-A-B-E\)
- In friendship example, now \(C\)
depends less on \(A\) because can play
with \(D\); and \(B\) depends less on \(A\) because can play with \(E\)
Balancing operation 2: extend the “power network”
Example of extending the power network from Jim Crow laws
- A decade after US Civil war “Jim Crow” laws curtail political
participation and make land ownership difficult
Scenario: \(B\) and \(C\) are African Americans; \(A\) is orange plantation they work on
- Jim Crow laws make it difficult for \(B\) and \(C\) to make a living by owning a farm or by
working in different occupations
- Therefore, big farm \(A\) pays
\(B\) and \(C\) low wages, because they have no other
options
Lengthening network: \(B\) pays
\(C\) find alternative ways to make a
living besides working for orange plantation \(A\)
- Potential examples of lengthening network
- \(B\) and \(C\) allowed to work for different employers
in different jobs OR
- \(B\) and \(C\) allowed to own their own business or
own property
- Consequences of \(A\) and \(B\) being allowed to lengthen the network:
- They Could leave relationship with \(A\)
- OR \(A\) forced to
increase wages until \(A\) is better
option than other employment options
Operation 3: make \(A\) care more
about goals controlled by \(B\)
Power imbalance (Dba > Dab): Powerful \(A\) making demands on \(B\)
In balancing operation 3, \(A\)
becomes more invested in goals mediated by \(B\)
- Reduces power imbalance by increasing dependence of \(A\) on \(B\)
Actor \(A\) is dependent on actor
\(B\) if:
- Actor \(A\) cares about goals
mediated by actor \(B\)
- Actor \(A\) cannot easily achieve
these goals outside the \(A-B\)
relation
- Key concept: Availability
- how easy to find some other actor (e.g., \(C, D, E\)) to achieve goal mediated by
actor \(B\)
Scenario: Actor \(A\) is boss, actor
\(B\) is worker, and actors \(C, D, E\) are also workers
- Dependence of boss (\(A\)) on
worker \(B\) increases if worker \(B\) learns special skills that (1) are
necessary to achieve goals valued by boss and (2) that other workers
don’t have
Some real life examples
- my first job as research assistant at Abt Associates
- I was expendable until I learned statistical programming
- research assistants that work for me
- takes 1-2 years to train them; once trained, I live in fear they
will leave
- I like teaching statistics/programming because students literally
become more powerful in jobs when they learn valuable skills that are
hard to find
Pair and share: analyze a relationship
Pair and share: analyze an unbalanced power-dependence
relationship
Goal:
- analyze an unbalanced power-dependence relationship you have
experienced as a student or in your professional life
Choose any relationship you have experienced. Below is prompt from
last year:
Imagine that you are a UCLA graduate student who pays for tuition and
cost of living by working as a graduate assistant/research
assistant/administrative assistant (you decide the specifics) for a
faculty member/office/department on campus at UCLA (you decide the
specifics). Imagine that you are unhappy with the working conditions
(e.g., expected to work more hours than you get paid for, insufficient
emphasis on your professional development, etc.).
After each of you choose a relationship, discuss the following:
- Using concepts from Emerson (1962),
describe the power-dependence relations between you (actor \(A\)) and the other actor (actor \(B\)) (e.g., boss, advisor)
- identify a couple concrete “balancing operations” that could improve
your employment situation. Make sure you can articulate in your own
words:
- the generic “balancing operation” as described by Emerson (1962)
- the particular action you could take that is a concrete example of
the generic balancing operation
- Which of these potential actions would be the best approach and
why
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978),
chapters 2 and 3
Chapter 2: Organization and social context defined
Organizationals and organizational goals
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) rejects
the idea that organizations “have goals”
- because individuals and collective actors (i.e., coalitions) within
organizations have different goals.
How Pfeffer & Salancik (1978)
define organizations:
- An organization is not concrete social entities
- rather, an organization is a constantly changing set of coalitions,
with each coalition pursuing different set of goals
More on coalitions
- Recall Emerson (1962) definition of a
“coalition” as two or more people acting as one “collective actor”
- e.g., UCLA students form a group to fight tuition increases; HEOC
students form coalition to influence faculty hiring
- individuals in coalitions do not have to share the same goals. All
they need some inducement strong enough to get them to participate
Organizational actions and organizational decisions
- Although organizations do not “have goals,” they do engage in
actions and make decisions (e.g., adopt new policy, approve budget,
grant tenure)
- Given that org is composed of lots of competing coalitions vying for
decision-making power, question becomes which actors/coalitions
influence org actions
The dominant coalition
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978)
perspective on who influences org actions draws on idea of “dominant
coalition” from Cyert & March
(1963)
- orgs composed of coalitions, defined as “multiple groups of
individuals pursuing similar interests”
- Each group attempts to imporse its preferences (goals) on the larger
system
- Groups seek out other groups with compatable interests to be allies;
give “side payment” io other groups for payment
- Dominant coalition is composed of each group whose interests must be
taken into account when determining org decisions
- but some groups within the dominant coalition may have more say than
others
Additional ideas on dominant coalition
- Recognizes that different people/groups don’t have same level of
power
- In most cases, no single individual or group is able to completely
determine the goals of the organization
- dominant coalition may include and represent the interests of
constituencies or “stakeholders” outside of the formal boundaries of the
organization”
- dominant coalition within an org changes over time, depending on
internal and external power dynamics
The dominant coalition
Dominant coalition is composed of multiple groups, but some groups
have bigger say than others in determining organizational decisions
So which groups within dominant coalition have most influence in org
decision-making?
- Answer: the groups most responsible for acquiring resources the org
values and cannot obtain elsewhere
Chapter 3: Social control of organizations
Resource dependence theory overview
Overview of resource dependence theory (RDT)
- Organizations depend on resources from external environment to
survive
- RDT shows that an org is sensitive to demands of important external
resource providers
- These external resource providers attempt to influence the behavior
of the org
- second half of Pfeffer & Salancik
(1978) discusses how orgs respond to demands from external
resource providers
Dependence of one org on another
Chapter 3 describes the dependence of one org on another org
- Draws heavily from Emerson (1962)
conceptions of dependence and power
- power = ability of actor \(A\) to
get actor \(B\) to do what they would
not otherwise do
- dependence: \(B\) dependent on
\(A\) to the extent that \(A\) controls goals that \(B\) values and that \(B\) cannot obtain outside \(A-B\) relationship
Three factors determine the dependence of one [focal] organization on
an external organization (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978)
- importance of the resource provided by external
org; extent to which the focal organization requires it for continued
operation/survival
- Discretion. Extent to which external org has
discretion over allocation and use of the resource
- e.g., all orgs require electricity, but electric company cannot
simply refuse to sell electricity to an org
- Alternatives. Extent to which there are few
alternatives
Resource importance
Resource importance a function of two factors (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978)
- Relative magnitude: the proportion of total inputs
or the proportion of total outputs accounted for by the resource
exchange
- e.g., both car companies (e.g., Toyota) and computer manufacturers
(e.g., Dell) require steel, but the relative magnitude of steel higher
for car companies than computer manurfacturers
- Criticality of the input: ability of the
organization to continue functioning in the absence of the resources or
in the absence of the market for the output
Resource importance and uncertainty
- “The fact that a resource is important to the organization’s
functioning is…not the source of the organization’s problems.
Problematic conditions of resources come from the environment. When the
supply of a resource is stable and ample, there is no problem for the
organization. Organizational vulnerability derives from the possibility
of an environment changing so that the resource is no longer
assured.”
Dependence and control
A focal organization is highly dependent on an
external organization/group if:
- external org controls resource that is important for
survival/operation of focal org
- external org has discretion over allocation of resource the focal
org requires
- focal org cannot obtain resource from other providers
In turn, dependence measures the ability of the external org to
control the focal org
- If focal org highly dependent on external org, external org has
great power over focal org
Dependence and internal actors
Let’s return to the question of which internal actors in the focal
organization exert the most influence in org decision-making
According to Pfeffer & Salancik
(1978), internal actors that are most influential in org
decision-making are:
- the ones most responsible for garnering external resources that are
important for org survival/success and are not widely available
Some examples:
- As public universities become more tuition reliant (and more
sensitive to rankings), VP for enrollment management becomes more
influential in org decision-making
- At University of Arizona, biggest revenue source and biggest source
of prestige was federal research funding in STEM fields
- Therefore, STEM faculty had more influence in org decision-making
than non-STEM faculty
- At University Nebraska Omaha, biggest resource provider was Omaha
business community headed by Warren Buffet
- Business school faculty have strongest relationship w/ Omaha
business community, most responsible for garnering resources from
business community, so influenced org decision-making more than other
faculty members
Career advice from Emerson (1962) and
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978)
Emerson (1962) and Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) generally useful
for the question, “should I do this thing that person X wants me to
do?”
Times Emerson (1962) and Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) steered me in
right direction
- As grad student, saying “no” to unreasonable demands from bosses
outside my department but saying yes to demands from advisor
- As assistant prof at U. Arizona, saying “no” to dept head who wanted
me to be his research assistant; but making sure I was bringing in
enough prestige from external environment to not need his support
Times Emerson (1962) and Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) yielded bad
advice
- University of Arizona “cluster hire” initiative
- Whenever I gave advice based on Emerson
(1962) and Pfeffer & Salancik
(1978) to someone who was not a white male
References
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the
firm (pp. 332 p.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations.
American
Sociological Review,
27(1), 31–41. Retrieved from
<Go to
ISI>://A1962CBJ7800003
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of
organizations: A resource dependence perspective (pp. xiii, 300
p.). New York: Harper; Row.
Taylor, K.-Y. (2017).
How we get free: Black feminism and the
combahee river collective (pp. 191 pages). Chicago, Illinois:
Haymarket Books.
https://doi.org/99977431871